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Abstract. The on-demand approach, where systems are assembled from
components by lay users, has seen success in the consumer electronics
industry. Currently, there is growing demand for on-demand capabilities
in medical systems so caregivers can create larger medical systems from
smaller medical devices. Unlike consumer electronics, medical systems
pose challenges for the on-demand approach due to attributes such as de-
vice complexity, device variability and safety requirements. In this paper,
we propose a formal speciﬁcation language for on-demand (medical) sys-
tems. Our approach is based on the formalism of Modal I/O Automata,
which allows system designers to express complex device requirements
and can be used to reason about safety and liveness properties of on-
demand medical systems directly from their speciﬁcations. We illustrate
the applicability of our approach through a case study of a closed-loop
patient controlled analgesia system.
1 Introduction
An on-demand system is any system assembled by a lay user out of compo-
nents that have not been previously tested together. An example on-demand
system is a home entertainment system: A typical home theater is composed of
speakers, an audio/visual receiver, a content source (such as a DVD player or
streaming video device), and television. Assembly of these on-demand systems
is facilitated by a `plug-and-play' capability in the components themselves; in
theory each component conforms to a well deﬁned standard (e.g., USB, HDMI,
Bluetooth) which then ensures that the components properly compose to form a
functioning system. The standards typically deﬁne a small set of rigid component
classes. For example, the USB standard deﬁnes around 20 classes for diﬀerent
component types such as mass storage (external hard drives), human interface
device (keyboards and mice), audio, and video. The feature sets for each class
are ﬁxed (and relatively simple).
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2Recently, there has been interest in on-demand medical systems where health
care workers can assemble larger medical systems out of smaller medical devices
at the bedside in order to provide better therapy for their patients [25]. These
on-demand systems would be used to provide better physiologic alarms (by com-
bining data streams from multiple medical devices) and closed loop control (using
physiologic sensors to drive actuators). While there is demand from the medical
community, critical care medical systems have two major attributes which pose
engineering challenges for the on-demand approach.
First, medical devices tend to be more complex. Unlike consumer electron-
ics, critical care medical devices are very complex and variable, even among
devices designed for a similar purpose (e.g., infusion pumps). Often, this com-
plexity and variability is the result of diﬀerent ways device manufacturers have
chosen to mitigate certain safety hazards. The complexity and variability means
it is diﬃcult to capture the range of behavior of a single device class in a standard
similar to USB where the features and behavior of each class are fully enumer-
ated beforehand. Second, on-demand medical systems serve a safety critical
purpose; if the composite system malfunctions or is implemented incorrectly in-
jury or death could result. Traditional safety critical systems such as aircraft,
nuclear power plants and standalone medical devices are evaluated for safety
before they are delivered to the user. The state of the art in safety assesment is
to consider the completely assembled system as a whole. In on-demand medical
systems this would not be possible because each system instance may be as-
sembled by combining devices that have never been tested together. There must
be some mechanism in place to analyze the behavior of all instantiations of a
on-demand system in order to ensure that any instantiation only exhibits safe
behavior.
There have been a number of high-level proposals for how to achieve safe
on-demand medical systems [20, 11, 25, 5]. These proposals all involve separating
system functionality between interoperable componenets: coordination applica-
tions (apps), medical devices, and a Medical Application Platform (MAP). In
these proposals, each type of system component would be regulated, certiﬁed,
and then obtained by the health-care organization separately [12]. We now pro-
vide a brief overview of the role and use of each system component type.
Apps are software programs that provide the coordination algorithm for a
speciﬁc clinical scenario (i.e., smart alarms, closed-loop control of devices, etc.).
In addition to executable code, these apps contain device requirements decla-
rations: a formal model of the medical devices they need to operate correctly.
These apps would be validated and veriﬁed against their requirements speciﬁca-
tion before they are marketed. Symmetrically, the interoperable medical devices
carry a self-descriptive model, known as a capabilities speciﬁcation. Each med-
ical device would be certiﬁed that it conforms to its speciﬁcation before it is
marketed and sold to end users.
The MAP provides a trusted base: It executes the coordination apps and fa-
cilitates the assembly of the on-demand system. When a user connects a medical
device to the network, that medical device will transmit its capabilities speciﬁ-
3cation to the MAP. Likewise, when a user attempts to launch an app, the MAP
analyzes the app's requirements speciﬁcation and the connected devices' capa-
bilities speciﬁcations. If the devices do not have the required capabilities, the
MAP will prevent the app from running and notify the user. This functionality
is critical to the assembly of on-demand medical systems because it is the foun-
dation for any safety or eﬀectiveness claim; in theory only systems which exhibit
the behavior captured by the app (and its associated requirements speciﬁcation)
will be instantiated. This enables various stakeholders (e.g., app developers and
regulatory agencies) to verify and validate the behavior of all possible instan-
tiations of an on-demand system by checking the behavior of the application
against its requirements speciﬁcation.
Finally, each of these components would implement an interoperability stan-
dard. The standard would specify allowed network transport protocols, how med-
ical and system information is encoded on the network, provide a basic means
to establish an interconnection between components, and expose logical inter-
faces for the transmission of data or commands. Current interoperability stan-
dards, such as IEEE-11073 POC [16], IEEE-11073 PHD [9, 8] and Health Level 7
(HL7) [10] focus mainly on data interoperability (i.e., they provide a mechanism
for the exchange of data). Notably absent in current standards is the ability to
address the reactive behavior of various medical systems. This means that cur-
rent standards are largely unsuitable for interoperable medical systems where
multiple devices are coordinating to provide autonomous delivery of care.
Our ability to reason about an on-demand medical system a priori (i.e.,
before it is instantiated) depends on how the app requirements and device capa-
bilities are speciﬁed. There are three major goals that must be met by a suitable
speciﬁcation language:
G1 The language must enable us to automatically relate app device require-
ments speciﬁcations to device capabilities speciﬁcations: properties which
must hold for apps composed with their requirements speciﬁcation must
hold for any ad hoc system where the app is composed with compatible
devices.
G2 The language must enable app developers to explicitly specify variability in
required device behavior: if all safety properties are satisﬁed with a highly
variable device requirements speciﬁcation it means the app is compatible
with a larger set of medical devices.
G3 The language must be expressive enough to specify arbitrarily complex and
reactive behavior.
In this paper, we propose a modal speciﬁcation language for on-demand
systems which addresses G1, G2 and G3. This formalism could be layered onto
existing standards to enable the speciﬁcation of device behavior. Syntactically,
it is a simple, state-based language inspired by Alur and Henzinger's Reactive
Modules formalism [1]. Semantically, each module deﬁned in the language is
equivalent to a modal I/O automaton (MIOA) [24], a formalism that extends
labeled transitions systems with a may/must modality on transitions and an
input/output/internal distinction on action labels.
4MIOAs are well suited for reasoning about on-demand systems for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the may/must distinction of transitions is useful for specifying
the behavioral variability of devices: must transitions denote required behavior
and may transitions represent allowed behavior. Thus, we can use MIOAs to
reason about all possible instantiations of an on-demand system based on the
speciﬁcation. Second, we show that the weak modal reﬁnement relation of MIOAs
preserves both safety (nothing bad happens) and liveness (something good even-
tually happens) properties. The guarantee of safety and liveness properties are
essential for on-demand medical systems, e.g.,
 the patient's SpO2 level should never be lower than 95" (safety)
 the laser must be completely deactivated to allow the ﬂow of the oxygen
concentrate from the ventilator" (liveness)
Third, the compositionality of MIOAs allows us to easily verify the behav-
ior of component-based on-demand systems by verifying their speciﬁcations. For
example, if we ﬁnd a medical device that reﬁnes an app's requirements speciﬁca-
tion, then we can claim that the system created by composing the app with that
device will satisfy all safety and liveness properties satisﬁed by the composition
of that app and its requirements speciﬁcation.
We have prototyped our approach using the MIO Workbench tool [6] and the
PRISM model checker [22], and applied it to a few case studies. In this paper,
we report on the application of our approach to the case study of a closed loop
patient controlled analgesia system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe one
possible application of on-demand medical systems as a motivating example. In
Section 3 we describe our proposed speciﬁcation language and the underlying
MIOA semantics. Section 4 contains a case study where we apply language to
specify an on-demand medical system and then verify properties of that system.
We conclude the paper, discuss current weaknesses of the approach, and propose
directions for future work in Section 5.
2 Motivating Example
In this section we describe Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA), the hazards of
PCA, and how a closed-loop system could be used to mitigate those hazards. The
purpose of the example itself is twofold. First it illustrates how the functionality
of the closed-loop system can be divided between an app and medical devices.
Second, it allows us to show variability among the same class of medical device
and how that variability can aﬀect the safety of an on-demand system.
After trauma (e.g., invasive surgery) patients convalescing in an ICU are often
placed on PCA therapy for pain management. During PCA therapy, patients are
attached to an infusion pump loaded with a painkiller (e.g., an opiod). When
the patient desires additional pain-relief, they press a trigger which causes the
pump to deliver a bolus of medication. While PCA lets patients manage their
own pain-levels eﬀectively [15] it also creates an opportunity for overdose. Opiod
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Fig. 1: A closed-loop PCA system.
overdose can result in respiratory depression, which in turn can result in injury
or death [17, 27, 13]. One possible way to mitigate the hazard posed by PCA is
to `close the loop': analyze data from sensors attached to the patient in real-time
to determine if the patient is nearing respiratory distress and, if so, disable the
pump [26, 19].
As shown in Figure 1, the system consists of four components: a pulse oxime-
ter, an app, a PCA infusion pump and a patient. The system operates in a
closed-loop fashion: the pulse oximeter keeps monitoring the patient's SpO2 value
(measure of blood oxygenation), and the app controls the PCA pump based on
the SpO2 value read from the pulse oximeter (the app would stop the pump if
the detected SpO2 value is lower than 95). When the PCA pump is turned on, it
delivers drug to the patient with a normal infusion rate pre-programmed by the
caregiver; however, if it receives a bolus request from the patient, then a higher
drug dose will be supplied, unless the pump is stopped by the app.
This application has one main safety property: the infusion rate of the pump
should always be 0 (i.e., the pump is oﬀ) whenever the patient has an SpO2
below a certain threshold (e.g., SpO2 < 95). The satisfaction of this property
depends on both the algorithm implemented by the app and the behavior of
the PCA pump the app is managing. Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of three
diﬀerent types of PCA pumps as state machines. Figure 2a represents a simple
infusion pump that infuses while it receives the on signal. Technically speaking,
the pump of Figure 2a is not a PCA pump because it doesn't provide any
mechanism for the patient to request a bolus. Figure 2b represents a PCA pump
that will infuse at a rate of 1 while it receives the on signal and it will infuse
at a rate of 2 when the patient requests a bolus, even if it is receiving the oﬀ.
Finally, Figure 2c represents an even more complex PCA pump. This pump will
autonomously disable itself under a number of conditions in order to mitigate
several hazards associated with infusion pumps [4]. For example, if the pump
detects air bubbles in the infusion line, it will halt infusion and raise an alarm
in order to prevent an air-embolism.
So, which pump should we choose to use? If we plug any of these three pumps
into the system, will the patient's safety be guaranteed? And is there an easy way
to verify the eﬀectiveness of the PCA system? These questions will be answered
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Fig. 2: MIOAs for three diﬀerent PCA pump devices.
in Section 4 by applying our modal speciﬁcation approach, which is explained
in the next section.
3 A Speciﬁcation Language for on-demand Systems
In this section, we propose a simple, state-based speciﬁcation language for de-
scribing the requirements of on-demand systems. This language can be applied,
for example, by app developers to specify the desirable behavior of compatible
medical devices. The language is based on Alur and Henzinger's Reactive Mod-
ules formalism [1], with the extension of transition modality (i.e., distinguishing
must and may transitions). We ﬁrst deﬁne the syntax of our proposed language
in Section 3.1, and then give its semantics in Section 3.2.
3.1 Syntax
We deﬁne each component of an on-demand system as a module M , which
is a tuple
(
(inM , outM , intM ), varM , (mustM ,mayM )
)
where (inM , outM , intM )
is the signature of M representing sets of input, output and internal actions,
varM is a set of state variables, and (mustM ,mayM ) are sets of must and may
transitions.
A module communicates with the external environment via input and output
actions in the CSP style [14]; that is, an input (resp. output) action, denoted
by c?v (resp. c!v), enables the module to receive (resp. send) message v over
a named channel c. The message v, which for example can be an expression
about some previous inputs or a valuation of some local variable of the module,
must be typed. Sometimes, message v is omitted from an input/output action,
denoted by c? or c!, with the interpretation that there is only a single possible
message can be transmitted through channel c. The set of internal actions intM ,
representing internal events of module M , are not observable to the external
environment.
7module M1
input: a?integer[0..1], b?;
output: c!;
internal: τ ;
s : [0..3] init 0;
[a?v] (s = 0)
must−−−→ (s′ = 1);
[c!] (s = 2)
must−−−→ (s′ = 3);
[τ ] (s = 3)
must−−−→ (s′ = 3);
[τ ] (s = 0)
may−−→ (s′ = 2);
[b?] (s = 1)
may−−→ (s′ = 3);
endmodule
Fig. 3: An example module speciﬁcation.
The variable set varM deﬁnes the local state space of module M . A state
variable s ∈ varM can be either a Boolean value, or an integer within a predeﬁned
ﬁnite range. We suppose that each variable s has an initial value s.
The behavior of module M is deﬁned by the set of must/may transitions
(mustM ,mayM ). Each transition t ∈ mustM ∪mayM takes the form (a, g,m, u),
comprising an action label a, a guard g, a modality labelm and an update u. The
action a ∈ inM∪outM∪intM can be either an input/output action synchronizing
with the external environment, or an internal event occurring within the module.
The guard g is a predicate over the state variables varM , determining if transition
t is enabled. The modality label m ∈ {must ,may} indicates if the transition is
required (i.e., must occur) in all implementations or if it is allowed (i.e., may
occur) in any implementation. The update u describes the eﬀect of transition t
on state variables; more speciﬁcally, u = (s′1 = expr1)∧· · · (s′n = exprn) where s′i
denotes the updated value of state variable si ∈ varM , and expr i is an expression
in terms of the state variables.
Example 1. Figure 3 shows an example module M1 described in our proposed
speciﬁcation language. The description is split into four parts, deﬁning actions,
state variables, as well as must and may transitions of the module. The module
M1 has two input actions: a?integer[1..2]" that receives a integer value within
the range {1, 2} via channel a", and b?" that receives an input via channel b"
(the message is omitted). The module may send an output through action c!",
and has a single internal action τ .
We also see that M1 has a single interger-valued variable s with the range
{0, . . . , 3} and an initial value 0. There are four transitions inM1. Each transition
t = (a, g,m, u) is written in a line “[a] g
m−→ u; ”. For example, line [a?v] (s =
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Fig. 4: Three example MIOAs.
0)
must−−→ (s′ = 1);" represents a must" transition with action a?v", guard
(s = 0) and update (s′ = 1).
3.2 Semantics
The semantics of our speciﬁcation language is based on Modal I/O Automata [24]
which in turn are extensions of Modal Transition Systems [23]. A modal I/O au-
tomaton (MIOA) can be considered as a (nondeterministic) state transition sys-
tem with an input/output/internal distinction on action labels and a must/may
distinction on its transition relations.
Deﬁnition 1 (MIOA). A modal I/O automaton P is a tuple (SP , sP , inP , outP ,
intP ,→P ,→♦P ) where SP is a ﬁnite set of states, sP ∈ SP is an initial
state, inP , outP and intP are disjoint sets of input, output and internal ac-
tions, →P⊆ SP × actP ×SP is the must transition relation describing required
behavior, and →♦P⊆ SP × actP × SP is the may transition relation describing
allowed behavior (actP = inP ∪ outP ∪ intP ).
The mapping from a moduleM =
(
(inM , outM , intM ), varM , (mustM ,mayM )
)
described in our proposed speciﬁcation language to a MIOA P is straightforward.
We deﬁne the state space SP of P to be the set of all valuations of the state
variables in varM . The initial state sP is given by the initial values of variables
in varM . The action sets inP = inM , outP = outM , and intP = intM . And each
transition t ∈ mustM (resp. t ∈ mayM ) maps to a transition p a−→P p′ (resp.
p
a−→♦P p′) in P , where p and p′ are states given by the guard and update of t,
respectively.
Example 2. The moduleM1 described in Figure 3 maps to the MIOAM1 shown
in Figure 4a. There are four states {s0, s1, s2, s3} inM1, each of which maps to
a valuation of variable s = i for i ∈ {0, . . . , 3} in M1 . The initial state ofM1 is
s0, indicated by an incoming arrow in Figure 4a. The must transitions are drawn
in solid arrows, while the may transitions are drawn in dashed arrows.
In this paper, we consider only syntactically consistent MIOA where→P⊆→♦P ,
i.e., every required transition is also allowed. If the must and may transition
relations of a MIOA P coincide, denoted →P=→♦P , then we call P an imple-
mentation. An abstract MIOA with nonempty must and may transition relations
9speciﬁes a set of concrete implementations: a must transition asks that any legal
implementation must include that transition, while a may transition indicates
that implementations are allowed (but not required) to have that transition.
Formally, the relation between an abstract speciﬁcation MIOA and a concrete
implementation MIOA is captured by reﬁnements. There are many diﬀerent
types of reﬁnement relations between MIOAs [24, 7]. In our setting, we adopt
the weak modal reﬁnement relation [7], which ensures that the observable behav-
ior of an implementation (e.g., actual medical device) reﬁnes the speciﬁcation
(e.g., app requirements).
We need the notion of weak transitions to reason about the observable behav-
ior of MIOAs. Given an input/output action a of a MIOA P , there exists a weak
must transition between states p and p′, denoted by p ( a−→P )∗ p′, iﬀ there exist
a pair of states p1, p2 ∈ SP such that p ( τ−→P )∗ p1 a−→P p2 ( τ−→P )∗p′, where τ
denotes any arbitrary internal action and p (
τ−→P )∗ p1 represents ﬁnitely many
(zero or more) transitions from p to p1 labelled with internal actions. The notion
of weak may transitions p (
a−→♦P )∗ p′ can be deﬁned analogously.
Deﬁnition 2 (Weak Modal Reﬁnement). Given two MIOAs P and Q with
inP = inQ and outP = outQ, a relation R ⊆ SP × SQ is called a weak modal
reﬁnement for P and Q iﬀ for all (p, q) ∈ R and a ∈ actP ∪ actQ it holds that:
 if q
a−→Q q′ then there exists p′ ∈ SP such that p ( aˆ−→P )∗ p′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R,
 if p
a−→♦P p′ then there exists q′ ∈ SQ such that q ( aˆ−→♦Q )∗ q′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R,
where (
aˆ−→P )∗ = ( a−→P )∗ if a ∈ intP ∪outP , and ( aˆ−→P )∗ = ( τ−→P )∗ otherwise.
If there exists a reﬁnement relation R such that (sP , sQ) ∈ R, then we claim that
P weakly modally reﬁnes Q, denoted by P ≤∗m Q.
The weak modal reﬁnement relation deﬁned above allows implementations
to contain diﬀerent (i.e., unspeciﬁed) internal behavior as long as the internal
behavior does not prevent the implementation from performing required external
behavior. The reﬁnement also prevents implementations from performing `extra'
external behavior as long as the extra behavior is speciﬁed in the signature of the
speciﬁcation. It does allow implementations to introduce new external behavior
if that behavior is an action-label not speciﬁed in the speciﬁcation; in this case,
the transitions labled with that action are treated as τ transitions.
Example 3. The MIOA M′1 shown in Figure 4b weakly modally reﬁnes the
MIOAM1 shown in Figure 4a, under relationR = {(r0, s0), (r1, s0), (r2, s1), (r3, s3)}.
Note that the required transition s2
c!−→s3 in M1 does not have a mapping in
M′1, becauseM′1 does not contain a reﬁnement of the allowed transition s0 τ−→♦ s2
inM1 such that no reﬁnement of state s2 is reachable inM′1.
Recall that, in our proposed speciﬁcation language, a module (medical de-
vice) can comminucate with the external environment via sending/receiving mes-
sages. We now introduce a binary composition operator [24] to reason about the
10
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Fig. 5: A MIOA composition M1 ⊗M2.
message passing. We say that two MIOAs P1 and P2 are composable iﬀ the over-
lapping of their actions only occur on complementary types, i.e., (in1 ∪ int1) ∩
(in2 ∪ int2) = ∅ and (out1 ∪ int1) ∩ (out2 ∪ int2) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 3 (Composition). The composition of two composeable MIOAs P1
and P2 is given by a MIOA P1⊗P2 = (S, s, in, out , int ,→,→♦), where the state
space S = S1 × S2, the initial state s = (s1, s2), in = (in1\out2) ∪ (in2\out1),
out = (out1\in2) ∪ (out2\in1), int = int1 ∪ int2 ∪ (in1 ∩ out2) ∪ (in2 ∩ out1),
and the transition relations are given by the following rules (for γ ∈ {,♦}):
p1
a!→γ p′1 p2 a?→γ p′2
p1 ⊗ p2 a→γ p′1 ⊗ p′2
p1
a?→γ p′1 p2 a!→γ p′2
p1 ⊗ p2 a→γ p′1 ⊗ p′2
p1
a→γ p′1 a /∈ act2
p1 ⊗ p2 a→γ p′1 ⊗ p2
a /∈ act1 p2 a→γ p′2
p1 ⊗ p2 a→γ p1 ⊗ p′2
Example 4. Figure 5 shows the composition of two MIOAsM1 (Figure 4a) and
M2 (Figure 4c).M1 expects an input action a?v" in state s0 whileM2 sends
an output action a!v" in state t0, these two transitions are composed into a
transition s0t0
a.v−−→ s1t1 inM1 ⊗M2. Similarly, the may transition s1 b?−→♦ s3
in M1 composes with the must transition t1 b?−→t2 in M1, resulting in a may
transition s1t1
b−→♦ s3t2 in the product. Since τ is an internal action ofM1, the
τ -labelled transitions ofM1 compose with atomic transitions (self-loops) ofM2,
see for example, s0t0
τ−→♦ s2t0. Note that s2t0 is a deadlock state.
A motivation of our work is to design a speciﬁcation language that makes
verifying properties of medical devices easy. In particular, we are interested in
two kinds of properties: safety (something bad will never happen) and liveness
(something good will eventually happen). Formally, a safety property φsafe is
deﬁned as a liner-time property over a set of actions such that any inﬁnite word
w where φsafe does not hold contains a bad preﬁx (i.e., a ﬁnite preﬁx w
′ where
the bad thing has happened); a liveness property φlive (over a set of actions) is
an linear-time property such that each ﬁnite word can be extended to an inﬁnite
word that satisﬁes φlive .
Given a MIOA P and a safety or liveness property φ over actP , we deﬁne
two satisfaction relations:
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 P |= φ, under-approximates all reﬁnements of P satisfy φ";
 P |=♦ φ, over-approximates some reﬁnement of P satisﬁes φ".
To verify property φ on P , we need to prove that P |= φ is true; and to refute
property φ, we need to establish that P |= ¬φ holds.
We prove that weak modal reﬁnement preserves the veriﬁcation of safety and
liveness properties as follows.
Lemma 1. Let P and Q be two MIOAs such that P ≤∗m Q. Given a safety
property φsafe over actions inP ∪ outP , if Q |= φsafe , then P |= φsafe .
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose Q |= φsafe and P 6|= φsafe . The
latter means that there may exist some path ρ in P containing a bad preﬁx. For
simplicity, assume that the bad behavior is represented by a single word a. We
have a path ρ = p0 → · · · → pn−1 a−→♦P pn. Based on P ≤∗m Q and Deﬁnition 2,
there exists a pair of states q and q′ in Q such that (pn−1, q) ∈ R, (pn, q′) ∈ R
and q (
τ−→♦Q )∗ qi−1 a−→♦Q qi ( τ−→♦Q )∗q′. Therefore, there may exist a path in
Q containing the bad word a, which is a contradiction with Q |= φsafe . uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let P and Q be two MIOAs such that P ≤∗m Q. Given a liveness
property φlive over actions inP ∪ outP , if Q |= φlive , then P |= φlive .
Proof. Since Q |= φlive , every (inﬁnite) path in Q must eventually reach the
good condition. For simplicity, assume that the good condition is represented
by a single word a. Then, there must exists a pair of states qn−1 and qn in any
(inﬁnite) path ρ of Q such that ρ = q0 → · · · → qn−1 a−→Q qn → · · · . Based
on P ≤∗m Q and Deﬁnition 2, for each pair of qn−1 and qn, there must exists
a pair of corresponding states p, p′ in P such that (p, qn−1) ∈ R, (p′, qn) ∈ R
and p (
τ−→P )∗ pi−1 a−→P pi ( τ−→P )∗p′. Therefore, every inﬁnite path in P must
eventually reach the good condition, so that we have P |= φlive . uunionsq
Another nice feature about weak modal reﬁnement is the following composi-
tionality result:
Theorem 1 (Compositionality [2]). Let P1,P
′
1 and P2 be MIOAs (P1 and Q
are composable). If P ′1 ≤∗m P1, then P ′1 ⊗ P2 ≤∗m P1 ⊗ P2.
Based on the above theorem and Lemmas 1 and 2, we can verify safety and
liveness properties on medical devices without composing the (large) complete
systems. For example, let P1 be the speciﬁcation for some medical device, P
′
1 be
an implementation of the actual device, P2 be the external environment (e.g.,
app, patient) and φ be the desirable safety or liveness property. When designing
the speciﬁcation, the app developers make sure that P1 ⊗ P2 |= φ. We only
need to check whether the device P ′1 weakly modally reﬁnes the speciﬁcation
P1. If P
′
1 ≤∗m P1 holds, then we can claim that P ′1 ⊗ P2 |= φ without actually
verifying the composed system P ′1 ⊗ P2.
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s0 s3
s1
s2
a?v
b?
τ
c!
τ
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
Fig. 6: Translation of the MIOA in Figure 4a for PRISM.
4 Case Study
Now we apply our proposed speciﬁcation approach to analyze the closed-loop
PCA example from Section 2. We model each system component (i.e., app,
patient, Pulse Oximeter and PCA pump) as a MIOA. To answer the question
that, from the three PCA pumps shown in Figure 2, which one should we choose
to use, we use the MIOWorkbench tool [6] to check weather the MIOA of a pump
weakly modally reﬁnes the MIOA of the pump speciﬁcation. If the reﬁnement
relation holds, then the pump is good in the sense that the PCA system should
be able to guarantee the required safety property; otherwise, the pump is not
safe to use.
To demonstrate that our approach can help to preserve system properties,
we also use the (probabilistic) model checker PRISM [22] to verify the required
safety property of composed PCA systems because of PRISM's relative maturity
and ease of use. PRISM does not actually support the veriﬁcation of MIOAs. We
instead translate MIOAs as probabilistic automata (PAs): each must transition
becomes a transition with probability 1 and each may transition becomes a
transition with probability 0.5 1. For example, Figure 6 shows the probabilistic
translation of the MIOA in Figure 4a; the may transition from s0 to s2 now
becomes a transition with probability 0.5 (the black dot is the sink state). If
PRISM veriﬁes that certain property is true with probability 1, then the property
must" be satisﬁed by the on-demand medical system; and if the veriﬁcation
result is a real value p such that 0 < p < 1, then the system may" satisfy the
property.2
1 To make probabilistic distributions full, we complement each may transition with
a transition (with probability 0.5) to a sink state; however, the veriﬁcation result
would exclude all the paths leading to the sink state.
2 While an evaluation of scalability is beyond the scope of this paper, PRISM imple-
ments a number of eﬃcient model-checking algorithms for probabilistic systems and
can scale to models with at least 107 states.
13
PO1
toSensor?SpO2
toApp!SpO2
PO2
Fig. 7: MIOA for the pulse oximeter.
SpO2
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SpO2
=98
SpO2
=0
SpO2
=99
flowRate?1 flowRate?1 flowRate?1 flowRate?1
...
flowRate?0 flowRate?0 flowRate?0 flowRate?0
flowRate?2 flowRate?2 flowRate?2
toSensor!SpO2
bolus!
toSensor!SpO2
bolus!
toSensor!SpO2
bolus!
toSensor!SpO2
bolus!
Fig. 8: MIOA for the patient dynamics.
4.1 Modelling
Figure 7 shows the detailed model for the pulse oximeter, which is a two-state
modal I/O automaton synchronizing with the patient model via a must tran-
sition labelled with the input action toSensor?SpO2" and then immediately
sending the data to the app via another must transition with the output action
toApp!SpO2". Note that, in both actions, SpO2 ∈ [0, 100] is an integer value
transmitted over the input/output channel.
We adopt a simple patient model which only considers the patient's discrete
SpO2 measurements.
3 As shown in Figure 8, each state of the MIOA for the pa-
tient model represents a single SpO2 value, ranging from 0 to 100. With an initial
value of 100, the patient's SpO2 measurement decreases by 1 or 2 upon receiving
drug from the PCA pump at a normal infusion rate (ﬂowRate?1") or a bolus
rate (ﬂowRate?2"), respectively. On the other hand, the SpO2 value increases
by 1 if the PCA pump stops (ﬂowRate?0"), modeling the restoration of the pa-
tient's vital sign as the drug concentration reduces. At any point, the patient has
the option of pressing the button to request one more dose from the PCA pump
(denoted by the output action bolus!"). The patient's SpO2 level is constantly
monitored by the pulse oximeter via synchronizing over toSensor!SpO2".
The behavior of the control app is illustrated in Figure 9 using our proposed
speciﬁcation language4. The app has an input action toApp?" carrying integer
values SpO2 sent by the pulse oximeter, and two output actions on!" and oﬀ!"
which control the PCA pump. There are two state variables a and v. Initially we
assume a = 0 and v = 100. If an input action toApp?SpO2" is detected, the app
3 See [26] for an example of how continuous patient dynamics can be related to a
discrete model.
4 The corresponding MIOA has more than 200 states and thus is too large to be drawn
here.
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module app
input: toApp?integer[0..100];
output: on!, oﬀ!;
a : [0..1] init 0;
v : [0..100] init 100;
[toApp?SpO2] (a = 0)
must−−−→ (a′ = 1) ∧ (v′ = SpO2);
[on!] (a = 1) ∧ (v > 95) must−−−→ (a′ = 0);
[oﬀ!] (a = 1) ∧ (v ≤ 95) must−−−→ (a′ = 0);
endmodule
Fig. 9: App that controls the PCA pump.
updates a as 1 and sets v with the received SpO2 value. If v > 95, meaning that
the patient's vitals are not endangered, then the app outputs an on!" signal to
the PCA pump for allowing drug delivery; otherwise, an oﬀ!" signal is sent to
stop the PCA pump.
module pumpSpec
input: on?, oﬀ?, bolus?;
output: ﬂowRate!integer[0..2];
internal: τ ;
s : [0..5] init 0;
[oﬀ?] (s = 0)
must−−−→ (s′ = 1);
[on?] (s = 0)
must−−−→ (s′ = 2);
[on?] (s = 4)
must−−−→ (s′ = 5);
[oﬀ?] (s = 4)
must−−−→ (s′ = 5);
[ﬂowRate!0] (s = 1)
must−−−→ (s′ = 0);
[ﬂowRate!0] (s = 5)
must−−−→ (s′ = 4);
[ﬂowRate!1] (s = 2)
must−−−→ (s′ = 0);
[ﬂowRate!2] (s = 3)
must−−−→ (s′ = 0);
[bolus?] (s = 1)
may−−→ (s′ = 1);
[bolus?] (s = 2)
may−−→ (s′ = 3);
[bolus?] (s = 5)
may−−→ (s′ = 5);
[tau] (s = 0)
may−−→ (s′ = 4);
[tau] (s = 4)
may−−→ (s′ = 0);
endmodule
(a)
s0
s1
s2 s3
s4 s5
off? flowRate!0
bolus?
on?
τ
τ
flowRate!1
bolus?
flowRate!2
on?
off?
flowRate!0
bolus?
(b)
Fig. 10: The PCA pump speciﬁcation and its corresponding MIOA
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Figure 10a describes the speciﬁcation for the PCA pump, which should be
provided by the app developers, and Figure 10b shows the corresponding MIOA.
Under this speciﬁcation, if the pump is enabled by the on?" command from the
app, then it can deliver drug to the patient at a normal infusion rate ﬂowRate!1";
however, if it is disabled by the oﬀ?" command, then no drug will be delivered
(ﬂowRate!0"). Some pump may allow receiving bolus?" request from the pa-
tient, which are described as may" transitions in the speciﬁcation (dashed lines
in Figure 10b). To avoid the overdose of drug, the bolus?" request is only eﬀec-
tive (i.e., the pump delivers drug at a higher rate ﬂowRate!2") when the pump
is enabled by the app. A pump may shut itself down due to various reasons and
may also restore from the shutdown; the speciﬁcation allow these behavior by
describing them may" transitions labelled with an internal action τ . When a
pump is shutdown, it would not respond to any command from the app/patient
and no drug will be delivered.
4.2 Analysis
Figure 2 shows three PCA pump devices with diﬀerent functionality. Device (a)
has the basic functions of receiving commands from the app and delivering drug
to the patient accordingly. Device (b) has the additional function of adjusting
the drug infusion rate based on patients' bolus requests. Device (c) is the most
sophisticated equipment: apart from the functions of receiving app commands
(bolus requests) and delivering drug, it can detect air bubbles in the infusion line
and issue alarm, and also protect itself from overheating; if any of these hazards
is detected, the pump will shutdown automatically until the device is restored.
Our experiments indicate that devices (a) and (c) meet the speciﬁcation
requirements, because their corresponding MIOAs (Figures 2a and 2c) are both
weak reﬁnements of the speciﬁcation's MIOA (Figure 10b). However, device (b)
does not meet the speciﬁcation: the path
r0
oﬀ?−−−→ r1 bolus?−−−−−→ r3 ﬂowRate!2−−−−−−−−→ r0
in the device's MIOA (Figure 2b) does not have a mapping (allowed path) in
the speciﬁcation's MIOA.
We veriﬁed the safety property patient's SpO2 level should always be above
94" on the PCA systems composed using these three devices. It is not surprising
to ﬁnd that both systems of devices (a) and (c) satisfy the safety property, but
the system of device (b) violates the property. The violation is due to the fact
that device (b) always admits patients' bolus request even if the app has issued
the oﬀ" command.
5 Conclusion & Discussion
In this paper we have described an approach to specify on-demand systems
and applied that approach to an example application from the medical domain.
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This approach uses a speciﬁcation language with the semantics of MIOA. We
showed that weak modal reﬁnement can be used to check the compatibility
between app requirements and device capabilites by proving that weak modal
reﬁnement preserves both safety and liveness properties. This enables medical
systems developers to express complex medical device behavioral requirements,
explicitly specify allowed variability and reason about the behavior of on-demand
systems a priori.
While we provided a case study as a proof-of-concept for the approach, there
are many open questions concerning the engineering, safety and application of
on-demand medical systems in a critical care setting. First we note that there are
several areas where our proposed speciﬁcation language and associated semantics
would need to be extended to make the approach more applicable to real medical
systems. For example, the action labels in our language are only tagged with
simple data-types. Often, medical device actions relate directly to an interaction
with the physical world (e.g., an infusion pump infusing a drug). It would be
useful if action labels could also be tagged with physical types which would
denote the physical interaction of the action. Furthermore, our approach only
supports reasoning about discrete time systems. Real medical devices exhibit
continuous time behavior, and the ability to capture real-time behavior is critical
if we want to apply our approach to real medical systems. For example, the on-
demand medical systems described in [3, 26, 18] all rely on `timeout' behavior in
the medical devices to guarantee system safety in the presence of inter-device
communications failures. Additionally, many medical devices exhibit continuous
behavior in terms of their interactions with the patient. For example, infusion
pumps deliver drugs continuously according to `trumpet' curves [28]. It is not
known to what ﬁdelity a speciﬁcation will need to capture device behavior: Is
continuous time plus discrete behavior enough, or is a fully hybrid speciﬁcation
required? The answer to this question will likely depend on the types of on-
demand systems clinicians will want to employee.
Second, the approach described in this paper requires that medical devices
comply with their speciﬁcations. In theory this seems reasonable, but in prac-
tice it may not be possible to have total conﬁdence in a device's compliance
with its speciﬁcation. For example, a device may be non-compliant due to an
uncaught systematic defect (i.e., a design or implementation error), uncaught
manufacturing errors, or unaccounted for environmental interference (e.g., artiﬁ-
cal light interfering with a physiologic sensor). Should the speciﬁcation approach
be extended to capture the possibility of these errors? If so, what types of er-
rors and faults should be captured in the speciﬁcation versus left to other risk
management mechanisms?
Finally, medical devices can interact with each other indirectly through the
patient (e.g., a pulse-oximeter attached to a patient on supplementary oxygen
will sometimes give abnormally high readings). Should on-demand systems check
for these types of interactions automatically? Or should we rely on the medical
caregiver to determine which combinations of medical devices are appropriate to
use in a given situation? The answer is not clear; though at ﬁrst it may appear
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that automatic interaction checking could improve the safety of the system, in
practice doing thisis very diﬃcult due to the fact we currently lack a detailed
understanding of human physiology. This in turn can result in overly conser-
vative or sensitive checks. For example, modern computerized physician order
entry (CPOE) systems automatically check if a doctor prescribes drugs that may
interact adversely. In many cases hospitals have worked with vendors to disable
these checks because these checks are too conservative (i.e., generate an over-
whelming number of alerts) and the caregivers are competent enough to know
how the drugs will interact and whether or not the risk is justiﬁed for a par-
ticular patient [21]. The answer to this question will depend on the complexity
of on-demand medical systems, our level of understanding of patient physiology,
and the ﬁdelity of care those system are intended to deliver.
References
1. Alur, R., Henzinger, T.A.: Reactive modules. Formal Methods in System Design
15(1), 748 (1999)
2. Antonik, A., Huth, M., Larsen, K.G., Nyman, U., Wasowski, A.: 20 years of modal
and mixed speciﬁcations. European Association for Theoretical Computer Science.
Bulletin (95) (2008)
3. Arney, D., Goldman, J.M., Whitehead, S.F., Lee, I.: Synchronizing an x-ray and
anesthesia machine ventilator: A medical device interoperability case study (2009)
4. Arney, D., Jetley, R., Jones, P., Lee, I., Sokolsky, O.: Formal methods based de-
velopment of a pca infusion pump reference model: Generic infusion pump (gip)
project. In: High Conﬁdence Medical Devices, Software, and Systems and Medical
Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability, 2007. HCMDSS-MDPnP. Joint Workshop
on. pp. 2333. IEEE (2007)
5. Medical devices and medical systems - essential safety requirements for equip-
ment comprising the patient-centric integrated clinical environment (ice). http:
//enterprise.astm.org/filtrexx40.cgi?+REDLINE_PAGES/F2761.htm
6. Bauer, S.S., Mayer, P., Legay, A.: Mio workbench: A tool for compositional design
with modal input/output interfaces. In: ATVA. pp. 418421 (2011)
7. Bauer, S.S., Mayer, P., Schroeder, A., Hennicker, R.: On weak modal compatibility,
reﬁnement, and the mio workbench. In: TACAS. pp. 175189 (2010)
8. Carroll, R., Cnossen, R., Schnell, M., Simons, D.: Continua: An interoperable per-
sonal healthcare ecosystem. Pervasive Computing, IEEE 6(4), 9094 (2007)
9. Clarke, M., Bogia, D., Hassing, K., Steubesand, L., Chan, T., Ayyagari, D.: De-
veloping a standard for personal health devices based on 11073. In: Engineering
in Medicine and Biology Society, 2007. EMBS 2007. 29th Annual International
Conference of the IEEE. pp. 61746176 (2007)
10. Dolin, R.H., Alschuler, L., Boyer, S., Beebe, C., Behlen, F.M., Biron, P.V., Shvo,
A.S.: Hl7 clinical document architecture, release 2. Journal of the American Medical
Informatics Association 13(1), 3039 (2006)
11. Hatcliﬀ, J., King, A., Lee, I., Macdonald, A., Fernando, A., Robkin, M., Vasserman,
E., Weininger, S., Goldman, J.M.: Rationale and architecture principles for medical
application platforms. In: Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International
Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. pp. 312. ICCPS '12, IEEE Computer
Society, Washington, DC, USA (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCPS.2012.
9
18
12. Hatcliﬀ, J., Vasserman, E., Weininger, S., Goldman, J.: An overview of regulatory
and trust issues for the integrated clinical environment. Proceedings of HCMDSS
2011 (2011)
13. Hicks, R.W., Sikirica, V., Nelson, W., Schein, J.R., Cousins, D.D.: Medication
errors involving patient-controlled analgesia. American Journal of Health-System
Pharmacy 65(5), 429440 (March 2008)
14. Hoare, C.A.R.: Communicating sequential processes. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper
Saddle River, NJ, USA (1985)
15. Hudcova, J., McNicol, E., Quah, C., Lau, J., Carr, D.B.: Patient controlled intra-
venous opioid analgesia versus conventional opioid analgesia for postoperative pain
control: A quantitative systematic review. Acute Pain 7(3), 115132 (2005)
16. Iso/ieee 11073 committee. http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/
11073-10103-2012.html
17. Joint Commission: Sentinel event alert issue 33: Patient controlled analge-
sia by proxy. http://www.jointcommission.org/sentinelevents/sentineleventalert/
(December 2004)
18. Kim, C., Sun, M., Mohan, S., Yun, H., Sha, L., Abdelzaher, T.F.: A framework
for the safe interoperability of medical devices in the presence of network failures.
In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical
Systems. pp. 149158. ACM (2010)
19. King, A., Arney, D., Lee, I., Sokolsky, O., Hatcliﬀ, J., Procter, S.: Prototyping
closed loop physiologic control with the medical device coordination framework.
In: Proceedings of the 2010 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering in Health
Care. pp. 111. ACM (2010)
20. King, A., Procter, S., Andresen, D., Hatcliﬀ, J., Warren, S., Spees, W., Jetley,
R., Jones, P., Weininger, S.: An open test bed for medical device integration and
coordination. In: Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Software
Engineering (2009)
21. Kuperman, G.J., Bobb, A., Payne, T.H., Avery, A.J., Gandhi, T.K., Burns, G.,
Classen, D.C., Bates, D.W.: Medication-related clinical decision support in com-
puterized provider order entry systems: A review. Journal of the American Medical
Informatics Association 14(1), 29  40 (2007), http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S106750270600209X
22. Kwiatkowska, M., Norman, G., Parker, D.: PRISM 4.0: Veriﬁcation of probabilistic
real-time systems. In: Gopalakrishnan, G., Qadeer, S. (eds.) Proc. 23rd Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV'11). LNCS, vol. 6806, pp.
585591. Springer (2011)
23. Larsen, K., Thomsen, B.: A modal process logic. In: Logic in Computer Science,
1988. LICS '88., Proceedings of the Third Annual Symposium on. pp. 203210
(1988)
24. Larsen, K.G., Nyman, U., Wasowski, A.: Modal i/o automata for interface and
product line theories. In: Programming Languages and Systems, pp. 6479.
Springer (2007)
25. Medical device plug-and-play interoperability program. http://mdpnp.org/
(2008)
26. Pajic, M., Mangharam, R., Sokolsky, O., Arney, D., Goldman, J., Lee, I.: Model-
driven safety analysis of closed-loop medical systems. IEEE Transactions on In-
dustrial Informatics (2013)
27. Paul, J., sawhney, M., Beattie, W., McLean, R.: Critical incidents amongst 10033
acute pain patients. Canadian Journal of Anesthesiology 51, A22 (2004)
19
28. Voss, G.I., Butterﬁeld, R.D.: 27.1 performance criteria for intravenous infusion
devices. Clinical Engineering p. 415 (2003)
